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Introduction
2008 was a year of turmoil in the financial markets, rapid economic slow-
down and the start of recession in several European economies, bank bail-
outs and growing calls for protectionism (see Quaglia et al., in this volume).
We might expect the principal casualties of these developments to have been
European market integration and liberalization measures, the rigorous appli-
cation of EU Competition Policy rules and the adoption and application of
environmental and other measures that impose costs upon European industry.
EU fiscal policy rules have effectively been suspended and several bank
bail-outs by national governments have verged on breaking EU competition
policy rules. However, it is difficult to demonstrate that the internal market
and environmental legislative and policy agenda of 2008 was altered signifi-
cantly by reactions to the crisis.
As bankruptcies and unemployment rise in 2009, no doubt the negative
impact of the recession on market integration and liberalization will be further
felt. In 2008, one of the most significant policy developments concerning the
internal market was the stalled liberalization of the energy sector. However,
this was in no way linked to the economic slow-down: French and German
governments have long dragged their heels on liberalization in these sectors
and long opposed the unbundling of gas and electricity production and
supply. More surprising was the success in adopting ambitious targets to cut
EU carbon emissions over the next decade. Despite the inevitable watering
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down of the European Council’s initial goals and the Commission’s legisla-
tive proposals and the frequent disappointment of environmentalist groups,
this represents a considerable achievement – if not the greatest legislative
accomplishment for the EU in 2008. Following a brief analysis of the agree-
ment on energy markets, the bulk of this article is centred upon the climate
change package.
I. The Fudged Liberalization of Energy Markets
In 1996 and 1998, the EU adopted directives to liberalize, respectively, the
electricity and gas sectors (96/92/EC and 98/30/EC, revised in 2003). Several
Member States supported the Commission’s push for liberalization and
moved quickly to open their markets or, as in the case of the UK, had already
largely done so. Other Member States, notably France and Germany, were
sceptical if not hostile to full liberalization and the unbundling of production
and supply (Andersen, 2001). German and French governments stuck to the
minimum requirements of the 1996 and 1998 directives. The Commission
took legal action against no fewer than 17 Member States (by 2006), includ-
ing the UK, to force through some developments. The principal problems
encountered were: price discrimination to the benefit of historical customers;
lack of legal unbundling and insufficient managerial separation between
electricity and gas transmission and distribution system operators to ensure
that they were independent of each other; preferential access to networks for
historical customers and insufficiently transparent tariffs; lack of free choice
of supplier; and insufficient independence or competence granted to national
regulators, in particular to set tariffs for accessing the networks. In addition to
ideological opposition to liberalization there was persistent domestic political
opposition, with strong trade union, party political and public hostility –
stoked by the fear that gas and electricity prices would rise after liberalization.
One of the most contentious issues, third-party access to transmission net-
works for electricity and gas, was blocked by several Member States through
the discretion allowed in the 1996 and 1998 directives (Andersen and Sitter,
2006). The directive allowed Member States to choose between regulated and
negotiated third-party access and to develop or maintain their national regu-
latory models. Germany opted not to establish a new regulatory authority for
gas. A third ‘single buyer’ model was incorporated into the directive to allow
France to maintain elements of its national electricity monopoly, although this
option (in effect an opt-out) was never used. In several Member States, public
take-up of alternative energy providers has been minimal and market access
restricted. Homogeneous integration in the energy sector worked only
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with respect to a limited range of policy initiatives including price transpar-
ency for electricity and gas contracts.
The Commission continued to push for a complete unbundling of produc-
tion and supply which would force energy producers to sell off transmission
networks. It sought to break up large energy companies into production and
supply entities, arguing that only this would effectively allow new entrants
greater access to the market. The Commission argued that insufficient
competition inside Member States hindered investment in infrastructure and
kept prices artificially high. Giving competing energy companies access to
Europe’s pipeline and transmission networks would, it was claimed, reduce
the scope for market abuse by integrated suppliers. Independent transmission
businesses would have an incentive to install new pipes and wires to meet
demand, rather than restrict capacity to protect parent companies.
The March 2006 European Council agreed a new ‘Energy Policy for
Europe’ which set market liberalization among its top objectives, while the
March 2007 European Council renewed its commitment to proceed with the
liberalization of European energy markets, establishing a list of criteria with
which to proceed. In response, the EU energy commissioner, Andris Piebalgs,
renewed the Commission’s efforts to push ahead with unbundling. However,
eight Member States remained firmly opposed to forcing energy producers to
sell off transmission networks – the Group of Eight: France, Germany,
Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg and Slovakia. Given this
refusal but also the perceived need for a clearer EU legal framework, the
Commission decided to change tack.
In January 2008, the Commission proposed a new directive on unbundling
energy production. This directive would effectively allow Member States that
had not decoupled to avoid doing so. Energy companies would not be
required to sell grids and pipelines. However, they would face tougher regu-
lation and a requirement for more independent management. The Commis-
sion proposed the establishment of an independent system operator (ISO).
Big energy companies would retain ownership of the transmission lines, but
hand managing control over networks to an entirely separate operator which
would be required to have a different group of shareholders from the parent
company.
Yet this compromise gesture was still rejected by the Group of Eight which
argued that energy producers should be allowed to retain ownership of trans-
mission and called for a less radical energy liberalization scheme. Opponents
of unbundling argued that strong national champions were needed to square
up to Gazprom, the Russian gas giant that supplied much of Europe. When
one supplier was so dominant, they argued, the debate about asset ownership
was an irrelevance. In an open letter to the Commission, the Group of Eight
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also argued amongst other points that unbundling violated private property
rights, was incompatible with the free movement of capital and increased the
risk of EU companies falling under the control of non-European firms
(notably Gazprom).1
The Group of Eight presented their own proposal for a new EU directive
which called for a third option involving the creation of a so-called transmis-
sion system operator (TSO). Energy companies would be allowed to retain
their hold over both production plans and supply grids but the management
would be kept separate as a way to satisfy the Commission’s demand for the
separation of energy companies’ production and supply operations. While
independent from one another they would be connected only by a common set
of shareholders. Transmission system operators would be organized in the
legal form of a joint-stock company, would have their own corporate identity,
with separate branding, communication and premises. A strict regulatory
regime would be established in order to guarantee the separation. The Com-
mission challenged both the content and legal aspects of the Group of Eight’s
initiative. It argued that the proposal did not meet the criteria outlined by the
EU leaders in March 2007 for liberalization of the energy sector and that it
was illegal for Member States to initiate what was, in effect, a proposal for an
EU directive.2 The Commission insisted that only the two options outlined in
the January version of the directive – full ownership unbundling and an
independent system operator (ISO) – could be considered by the European
Parliament.
In early May, members of the European Parliament’s Industry Committee
backed the Commission’s two-choice solution and explicitly rejected the
Group of Eight’s third option. Yet the vote was close and MEPs split along
national, rather than party, lines. Some 26 committee members voted against
the third option, 22 MEPs were in favour, while three abstained, which
suggested that a vote in plenary could see a different outcome. The German
centre-right MEP Angelika Niebler, who chaired the Industry Committee,
asserted that ‘there will be a compromise, including the third way, or there
will be nothing’.3 Then, in a second vote on 19 May, the Industry Committee
made a U-turn, calling for the Commission to take on board the objections of
the Group of Eight.
In June 2008, Member State governments reached a compromise, agreeing
to embed into EU law the right for individual governments to choose one of
three different models of unbundling: full ownership unbundling, when a
1 EUObserver, 31 January 2008.
2 EUObserver, 20 February 2008.
3 EUObserver, 7 May 2008.
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parent company sells its transmission networks to a different firm; the inde-
pendent system operator (ISO) option proposed by the Commission in January
that allows big energy companies to retain ownership of the transmission lines,
but requires them to transfer managing control over networks to an entirely
separate operator (which would not share any shareholders with the parent
company); and a third option – very close to the one preferred by the Group of
Eight – the creation of a so-called independent transmission operator (ITO)
which permits a parent company to retain ownership of transmission networks
which would be heavily supervised by a national regulator. Under this new
third option, the new directive imposes additional requirements upon the parent
company and ITO to reinforce the independence of the latter, including a
mechanism preventing top management from moving freely between a com-
pany’s production and transmission wings. Management involved in transmis-
sion operations is not to be permitted to work three years before and four years
after in the parent company. Furthermore, the national regulator is to examine
the transmission operator’s development and investment plans and could
demand changes. While the new directive will bring about a change in national
practice in the eight Member States which have to date opposed unbundling,
the new directive in effect formally reinforces differentiation in the organiza-
tion of national energy markets. Opponents to the directive have argued that it
effectively endorses the anti-competition practices in certain Member States
and undermines full market liberalization and European market integration.4 In
a 9 July vote in the Parliament, 579 MEPs voted in favour, while only 80 were
against and 52 abstained.
II. Greening the Internal Market
Amongst the most significant EU legislative developments in 2008 was the
adoption of the climate change package. Four directives were adopted, estab-
lishing targets that, if met, should result in a significant reduction of CO2
emissions by the year 2020. Throughout the year, there were intense debates
on the precise provisions to be adopted – within and between Member States
governments, EU institutions, industrial interests and environmentalist
groups. The EU needed new targets on climate change to cover the period
following the Kyoto Protocol’s 2008–12 target dates and to cover the newest
12 Member States. The Commission and Member States also sought to
establish EU policies prior to international negotiations on Kyoto II to take
place in Copenhagen in December 2009. The Commission argued that Euro-
pean economies should adopt higher targets and direct increased funding to
4 EUObserver, 10 July 2008.
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green technologies as a double incentive to establish first-mover advantage.
The March 2007 European Council committed the EU to cutting carbon
emissions by at least 20 per cent on 2005 levels by 2020 and to increasing
energy security and requested the Commission to draw up necessary draft
legislation and policy proposals.
The EU-15 were on track to meet their collective target of 8 per cent under
the 1997 Kyoto Protocol of cutting greenhouse gas emissions by 8 per cent
for the period 2008–12 from 1990 levels, the Kyoto agreement’s baseline year
(EEA, 2008). While Denmark, Italy and Spain were behind in reducing
emissions, the performance of the other EU-15 nations was enough to com-
pensate. As of 2006, four Member States – France, Greece, Sweden and the
UK – had already apparently reached an emissions level below their Kyoto
target and the eight other states were on track to meet their targets. Further
reductions were to be achieved by a combination of domestic policies and
measures, reforestation and buying ‘carbon offsets’ – permitted under the
Kyoto Protocol – through which countries pay for other states to make the
carbon reductions on their behalf. However, it was likely that several Member
States would have to purchase more carbon offset credits than previously
planned in order to achieve their target. At the start of 2008, renewable energy
in the EU stood at 8.5 per cent of total production.
On 23 January 2008, the Commission presented an impressive climate
change package, consisting of three directives to be adopted by the Member
States. The package included three targets, known rather catchily as 20-20-
20: a 20 per cent overall reduction in CO2 emissions from a 2005 baseline, a
20 per cent increase in the share of renewable energies in energy consumption
and a 20 per cent increase in energy efficiency, all to be achieved by 2020. The
reduction in emissions would have to increase to 30 per cent by 2020 if an
international agreement was reached committing other major economies to
this higher target. The targets, for the period 2013–20 cover those industries
not included within the existing carbon emissions trading scheme (ETS) – the
EU’s key method for reducing greenhouse gases under the Kyoto Protocol –
notably agriculture, buildings and transport. The Commission also proposed
fines to be imposed upon Member States which did not meet targets: an
‘excess emissions penalty’ – equivalent to those imposed under the ETS of
around €100 per extra tonne of CO2 emitted. If a Member State did not pay
the penalty, the extra CO2 emitted would then be deducted from the ETS
allowances allotted to the Member State and sold instead by the European
Commission. Member States that ‘overachieved’ by cutting greenhouse gases
to below their targets would be able to sell that part of their emissions
allocation to another Member State. But any money from the sale would have
to be spent on ‘green’ investments such as renewable energy development or
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energy efficiency. The package also detailed how each Member State would
contribute to meeting the targets by 2020 (see Table 1).
The package included a proposal to reinforce the ETS – in which high-
polluting companies buy CO2 emission credits from lower-polluting firms in
order to meet national carbon output quotas. The existing ETS covered 11,186
energy-intensive installations throughout the EU – including power plants, oil
refineries, steel mills and cement factories – which produced almost half of
the EU’s CO2 emissions. Under the existing ETS, 90 per cent of credits were
given out free. The Commission argued that the existing ETS was faulty
because it was based on national emissions caps and did not provide enough
Table 1: Member State CO2 and Renewable Energy Targets (for 2020)
Member State CO2 targets (percentage
change from 1990 base)
Renewable energy targets
(percentage of total
energy consumed)
Austria -16 34
Belgium -15 13
Bulgaria +20 16
Czech Republic +9 13
Cyprus -5 13
Denmark -20 30
Estonia +11 25
Finland -16 38
France -14 23
Germany -14 18
Greece -4 18
Hungary +10 13
Ireland -20 16
Italy -13 17
Latvia +15 42
Lithuania +15 23
Luxembourg -20 11
Malta +5 10
Netherlands -16 14
Poland +14 15
Portugal +1 31
Romania +19 24
Slovakia +13 14
Slovenia +4 25
Spain -10 20
Sweden -17 49
United Kingdom -16 15
Source: Commission (2008).
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guarantees to achieve the 2020 goal. In the new proposed ETS, Member
States would no longer devise their own national allocation plans and grant
pollution permits to companies. These plans would be replaced from 2013 by
auctioning or free allocation through single EU-wide rules. The auctioning
revenues would be delivered to Member State governments. Apart from the
power sector which would be subject to full auctioning from the start of the
new regime in 2013, industrial sectors and aviation would increase auctioning
gradually, with the sale of one-fifth of pollution permits in 2013 rising by 10
per cent annually to 2020. In energy-intensive industrial sectors where the
competitiveness of companies would be strongly undermined by the ETS, the
free provision of ETS allowances could continue.
The Commission also proposed a directive on carbon capture and storage
– a carbon emissions reduction method that involved storing underground
carbon instead of releasing it into the atmosphere. The Commission
announced an overhaul of the rules on granting state aid for environmental
projects to permit an increased government subsidy of measures such as
carbon capture and storage (CCS), public transport projects and emissions
trading. Governments would be able to contribute up to 60 per cent of the cost
of environmental projects co-ordinated by large enterprises – up from 40 per
cent – and up to 70 per cent and 80 per cent for medium-sized and small
businesses, respectively, and up to 100 per cent for projects awarded by
competitive tender.
In a speech to the European Parliament on 15 January 2008, President
Barroso promised not to bow to Member State and industry pressure to water
down the Commission package. The Commission repeatedly argued that the
EU, by acting quickly, would have a first-mover advantage in the green
market. Furthermore, the EU’s international reputation for being a flag-bearer
for environmentally friendly proposals was at stake. In the months following
the 23 January launch of the legislative package, the Commission had to resist
intense Member State pressure to modify its directives and change its calcu-
lations on how much each Member State should contribute to CO2 emissions
reduction and renewable energy. Rich Member States criticized the method-
ology used to set national targets (GDP per capita and relative national
wealth) but several poorer Member States also expressed their opposition to
their targets.5 BusinessEurope, Europe’s main employers’ association, and
the European Round Table of Industrialists warned of the huge economic
implications of the revised ETS, and the disadvantage for European firms if
they had to comply with stricter environment rules than their American and
5 EUObserver, 13 March 2008.
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Chinese competitors.6 Industry also feared that the new ETS would begin
operation even if the 2009 international negotiations on a new climate change
deal failed to reach an agreement. To address this concern, the March Euro-
pean Council agreed that ‘appropriate measures’ would be taken if interna-
tional negotiations failed: energy-intensive industries could get free pollution
permits – instead of having to buy them by auction – linked to technological
benchmarks, while the EU could also seek to make foreign companies take
part in the ETS.
By mid-2008, it became apparent that nine Member States would be
obstructive on the climate change package: eight central and eastern Euro-
pean countries (CEECs) (Poland, Hungary, the three Baltic states, Romania,
Bulgaria and Slovakia) and Italy, with the Poles and Italians posing the
greatest potential threat to an agreement. In late May, seven CEECs (all the
above with the exception of Poland) proposed a different distribution of
carbon dioxide emission targets to those tabled by the Commission in
January, arguing that the new regime should take into account previous
national efforts in curbing climate change and future growth prospects.7 This
new proposal assigned the newest EU Member States lower targets on the
grounds that they expected to see a more rapid rise in industrial output in the
coming years. The seven CEECs also sought more generous emission quotas
in the sectors not included in the existing ETS, beyond those already provided
by the Commission in its January proposal which applied a solidarity prin-
ciple (according to GDP per capita) in allocations of quotas in areas such as
transport, waste, construction and farming, with richer countries receiving
stricter targets than poorer ones. The seven CEECs argued that the Commis-
sion’s proposal, which set 2005 as the new baseline year for setting new
emissions targets, did not fully take into consideration the efforts made by EU
countries in the fight against climate change from the early 1990s. The
Commission challenged these claims, arguing that the new Member States
underwent economic restructuring during the 1990s rather than real efforts to
cut emissions, and that relative wealth levels were already taken into consid-
eration in its proposal. The eastern Europeans claimed that there were serious
investments made at the time in more modern, cleaner technologies, pointing
to how emissions did not noticeably increase after their economies improved.
Italy and Poland threatened to veto the EU’s package to tackle climate
change, saying their economies could not bear the added burden that emis-
sions reductions would impose. They led efforts to block the launch of ‘full
6 See, for example, Financial Times, 21 January 2008.
7 EUObserver, 28 May 2008.
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auctioning’ of CO2 credits in heavy industry from 2013, pushing this back to
2020. With high-polluting coal plants producing 96 per cent of the country’s
energy, the Polish government feared that the introduction of the auction
system from 2013 would see its energy firms outbid by richer western rivals,
resulting in increased energy costs, hampered investment in new technologies
and lower economic growth.
The French Council Presidency of the second half of 2008 placed an
agreement on the climate change package at the top of its priorities and a key
criterion by which the success of the Presidency should be determined
(Dehousse and Menon, this volume). Italian and eastern European opposition
prevented an agreement on a common text at the October European Council.
In early December, President Nicolas Sarkozy met with eastern European
leaders in Gdan´sk to reach a compromise deal. Sarkozy offered the group of
nine countries (the eight mentioned above and the Czech Republic) to phase
in the CO2 permits payments for existing power facilities, with the nine
countries to receive 70 per cent of permits for free in 2013 dropping to zero
by 2020. Sarkozy also offered to lift the threat of legal penalties for countries
which did not meet their national CO2 reduction targets by 2020. He proposed
the organization of a 2016 climate change summit to introduce corrections to
any package agreed at the December European Council, if the impact upon
post-communist economies was too great. Sarkozy also promised to help the
CEECs construct nuclear power plants in the coming years, while President
Barroso offered the Polish government an extra €2 billion in energy infra-
structure grants up to 2013. The nine eastern European countries continued to
demand a CO2 ‘compensation mechanism’, which would assign them an
additional 10 per cent carbon emissions allowances compared to wealthier
EU states, allowing them to sell the credits to finance new power plants. In the
lead-up to the December European Council there were further concerns
about the impact of the financial crisis upon financing the climate change
package.
The MEPs on the European Parliament’s Environment Committee voted
to reinforce the European Commission’s legislative package on 7 October.
The day was dubbed ‘Green Super Tuesday’ by environmental groups
because of the committee’s marathon session which involved voting on all
three major laws in the Commission’s climate package because the French
Council Presidency sought to fast-track their adoption by Member States.
Committee MEPs voted to support the Commission’s national CO2 emissions
reductions but also voted to cut emissions still further in the future – by 50 per
cent as of 2035 and between 60 and 80 per cent by 2050. The MEPs accepted
the Commission’s proposed ETS reform, its fines on Member States that did
not meet their emissions targets and rules on selling excess emissions cut to
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another Member State. However, the committee also voted to ensure that
power companies, which had benefited from profits as a result of earlier free
allocation of permits, would be forced to pay for all their emissions permits
from 2013. The committee ring-fenced 100 per cent of auction revenues from
the ETS, a sum that could be worth as much as €50 billion a year by 2020,
strictly for climate-related purposes. More controversially, the committee
moved to decrease the Commission’s original proposals for the amount of
‘carbon offsets’ that European Member States could use towards their carbon
reduction targets. The December European Council reached an agreement on
the energy and climate package which effectively eliminated all the rein-
forced measures sought by the Parliament’s Environment Committee.
The final package was nonetheless approved by the Parliament on 17
December.
The Inclusion of Aviation in the ETS
There was a running battle throughout the year on whether the aviation
industry should be included in the ETS and, if so, from when. Although the
aviation sector was responsible for just 2 per cent of global carbon dioxide
(CO2) emissions in 2008, its contribution to climate change was, according
to some experts, growing faster than any other source, with greenhouse gas
emissions from aviation in the EU increasing by 87 per cent between 1990
and 2006, according to the Commission.8 In its January legislative package,
the Commission proposed for the aviation industry to take part in the ETS
from 2012. On 27 May, the European Parliament’s Environment Committee
voted for the aviation industry to be in the ETS from 2011, with the sector
having to pay for 25 per cent of its permits to produce carbon dioxide in the
first year and from 2013 falling into line with other sectors. The Environment
Committee agreed to include business jets in the scope of the scheme but
not small aircraft. Member States argued that only 10 per cent of pollution
permits should be auctioned. In June, negotiators from the Parliament and the
Council agreed that aviation should be included from 2012, with 15 per cent
of pollution permits to be auctioned and 85 allocated for free. The measure
would apply to all aircraft taking off or landing in the EU, including those of
non-EU companies. In July, the Parliament voted overwhelmingly (640 to 30)
for this and on 19 November, the Parliament and Council adopted the direc-
tive to include aviation activities in the ETS. The International Air Transport
Association (IATA) was incensed, arguing that many airlines would collapse
8 EU Observer, 6 February 2008.
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especially in a context of skyrocketing fuel prices. For their part, environ-
mental groups claimed that the measures approved would actually lead to
increased emissions on the grounds that the extra warming impact of aviation
emissions over ground-based CO2 emissions was unaccounted for in the
agreed scheme.9
The EU has encouraged the construction of less-polluting airplanes
through the Clean Sky initiative, a joint public–private partnership to develop
‘green’ aviation technologies, confirmed by an EU regulation in December
2007. With €1.6 billion in funding, the initiative was to be one of the biggest
EU research funding programmes in history. Aeronautics manufacturers
Airbus, Dassault, Saab and Rolls Royce signed up to the initiative. Half the
money is to come from the EU’s R&D funding programme with the other half
from industry. The aim of the initiative is to halve emissions of carbon dioxide
by 2020, cut nitrogen oxide by 80 per cent, halve noise pollution and set up
an eco-friendly life cycle for products – across design, manufacture, mainte-
nance and scrapping or recycling. The Clean Sky project involves 86 orga-
nizations from 16 countries: 54 private companies, 15 research centres and 17
universities.
The Carbon Capture Debate
In its January legislative package, the Commission called for the promotion of
a controversial carbon emissions mitigation technology known as ‘carbon
capture and storage’ (CCS). CCS ‘captures’ carbon dioxide from power plants
and stores it in underground geological formations or in deep oceans instead
of releasing it into the atmosphere. The CCS was presented as one mechanism
to help achieve the long-term goal of halving greenhouse gas emissions by
2050. The January package included a series of revised guidelines on state aid
for environmental protection that would enable Member State governments to
support CCS pilot project plants, because the current cost of the technology
was much higher than the price of carbon. Carbon dioxide captured and
stored would not be considered as emitted under the ETS. There were many
critics of the scheme. The iron and steel industry was very sceptical of the
EU’s schedule for the development of CCS prior to 2020. Environmental
groups also expressed concern as to the viability of CCS because it would
undermine efforts to cut back on fossil fuels usage. These groups argued that
the CCS process itself was very energy intensive and required the extra
extraction of fossil fuels and they noted the potential for leakage of CO2 from
underground sites.
9 EUObserver, 18 July 2008.
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The Automobile Industry and CO2 Reductions
Late in 2007, the Commission had proposed another EU directive (not part
of its climate change package) that from 2012, the average carbon dioxide
emissions of new cars would have to be reduced to 130 grammes per kilo-
metre – a reduction of about 24 per cent on the average 158 grammes of
CO2 per kilometre cars emitted in 2008. Companies that did not meet the
130g target would be fined €20 per gramme per kilometre over the limit in
2012, an amount that would increase to €95 by 2015. In 2007, automobiles
accounted for about 14 per cent of the EU’s CO2 emissions.10 Environmen-
talists wanted to see a target of 120g/km by 2012, in line with an official
EU target first proposed in 1994 by the then German environment minister,
Angela Merkel. The 14-year-old target was supposed to have been achieved
by 2005 but was postponed three times – in 1996, 1997 and 2007. The
European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA) – which repre-
sents 15 major producers – also opposed the emission cap of 130 grammes
per kilometre and insisted that any target should be based on an impact
assessment,11 estimating the new CO2 legislation would cost the industry
€25 billion while consumers would have to pay an extra €1,500 per car. The
ACEA lobbied for amendments to the legislation to introduce a three-step
phase-in of the emissions reduction targets, with 70 per cent of a company’s
car fleet having to meet the target in 2012, 80 per cent in 2014 and the full
fleet only having to meet the target in 2015. The industry also proposed a
considerable reduction in the fine imposed on car firms from €95 per
gramme per kilometre to €50. Member States were divided on the new
directive with some preferring to avoid making reference to any specific
figure. Other points of disagreement included the calendar and penalties and
as to whether revenues collected via penalties would be reverted to the
EU’s budget or be transferred to national coffers. It was also necessary to
define how to share the burden between different car manufacturers. While
Germany was the chief producer of large, heavy vehicles such as BMW,
Daimler and Porsche, French and Italian carmakers produced lighter, more
energy-efficient automobiles, such as Peugeot, Renault and Fiat.
There were significant divisions in the Commission on car emissions
that surfaced repeatedly throughout the year, with the German Industry
Commissioner, Günter Verheugen, adopting the more sceptical German
position on the directive that was championed by the Environment
Commissioner Stavros Dimas and formally approved by the College of
Commissioners. In a 14 January speech to the European Parliament, for
10 Financial Times, 25 September 2008.
11 EUObserver, 5 June 2008.
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example, Verheugen argued that the Commission’s directive should be
structured in a way that did not harm the competitive position of European
carmakers on the world stage.12 On 9 June, French President Sarkozy and
German Chancellor Merkel agreed to support the Commission’s proposal to
limit average CO2 emissions of new cars. Yet the two countries also called
for a period of several years to introduce the cap and for a softer line on
penalties imposed if industry failed. France further proposed that instead of
all cars sold in 2012 being restricted to emitting a maximum of 130
grammes of CO2 per kilometre, only 60 per cent of all new cars would have
to meet the standard, with new cars having to meet the target by 2015. The
proposal would effectively give car manufacturers an additional three years
to implement CO2 emissions reductions across the entirety of their fleets.
The French proposal recommended giving car companies credit for ‘eco-
innovations’ that produce cleaner vehicles or lower-emission cars. The
French government also sought exemptions for manufacturers that did not
sell many vehicles and credit offered to those that sold electric cars.
In a surprise vote, on 25 September, the European Parliament’s Environ-
ment Committee endorsed the Commission’s proposed directive on car emis-
sions, rejecting the amendments agreed by Member States on a phase-in and
industry pressure to extend the deadline to 2015. The committee also pro-
posed a second, deeper target of 95 grammes of CO2 per kilometre on average
by 2020, subject to a review in 2014. The 46 MEPs voting in favour (versus
19) included Socialists, Liberals and Greens. The Commission’s proposals
had still however to win approval of the full sitting of the Parliament, where
German MEPs across party lines would vote against it. On 6 October, the
ACEA asked the EU for a €40 billion loan to maintain a ‘level playing field’
with the US car industry which the Bush administration had just provided a
$25 billion support package.13 On 15 December, an inter-institutional agree-
ment was reached on car CO2 emissions which accommodated Member State
concerns. There would be a phasing-in of car volumes that needed to comply
with the target, starting with 65 per cent in 2012 – only slightly more than the
60 per cent agreed by the Member States – rising to 100 per cent in 2015. The
phasing-in of penalties would also be delayed with the €95 fine applying only
from 2019. The second deeper target of 95 grammes of CO2/km by 2020
would be non-binding and car manufacturers would be allowed to earn
eco-innovation credits which could contribute up to seven grammes to their
target until 2014.
12 EUObserver, 15 January 2008.
13 Financial Times, 6 October 2008.
146 DAVID HOWARTH
© 2009 The Author(s)
Journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
The Directive on Renewables
The third element of the Commission’s climate change package and third
major directive to be adopted concerned the development of renewable
energy sources with the target of 20 per cent renewables by 2020, with
binding national targets for each Member State (see Table 1). The adoption of
this directive was subject to comparatively little Member State discord,
although the Italians temporarily delayed the final agreement by demanding
that the 2020 target be subject to a review in 2014. Having been disappointed
by the legislation adopted in the other areas, environmental groups were very
supportive of the directive on renewable energy agreed by the Parliament,
Commission and Council on 9 December, calling it ‘historic’ and ‘the world’s
most important energy law’.14 By June 2010, Member States will have to draw
up national action plans describing how they will meet their 2020 targets,
which the Commission will then assess. Member States will also have to
report biennially on their progress. Central to the agreement are largely intact
proposals from the Parliament’s Industry Committee on greater co-operation
between Member States to achieve the target, including joint projects on
green electricity production, heating or cooling. Member States will also be
able to transfer renewable energy ‘statistically’ between themselves. The new
directive also permits the counting of green electricity consumed in a Member
State but produced via newly constructed joint projects with countries beyond
the EU.
The Biofuels Debate
The encouragement of biofuels as a source of renewable energy proved one of
the most controversial elements of the Commission’s climate change
package. At the March 2007 European Council, Member States agreed that
the EU should increase the use of biofuels in transport fuel to 10 per cent by
2020, up from the 5.75 per cent target to be achieved by 2010. However,
expert attitudes were already shifting dramatically on biofuels. In September
2007, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) pointed out the environmental and social risks created by biofuels.
The World Bank and the United Nations World Food Programme produced
similarly critical positions. In January 2008, the Commission’s own scientific
institute, the Joint Research Centre (JRC), leaked an unpublished internal
report criticizing the sustainability and social costs of biofuels.15 On 11
January, a group of 17 NGOs – including Oxfam and Friends of the Earth –
14 EUObserver, 10 December 2008.
15 Financial Times, 18 January 2008.
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sent a letter to the EU Energy Commissioner, Andris Piebalgs, asking him to
introduce much tougher standards on biofuel production or give up manda-
tory transport biofuel targets altogether.16 Several international organizations
and environmentalist groups saw increased production of biofuels as a major
contributing source of the dramatic rise in world food prices in 2008.
As opposition to biofuels grew, the EU came under increasing pressure to
develop a set of sustainability rules governing the fuel source. EU Member
States disagreed on what constituted ‘sustainable’. In April, President
Barroso requested a study on whether there was any relationship between the
recent jump in global food prices and biofuels. The move came amid specu-
lation that there was a growing division within the Commission over the
question. In mid-April, the Commissioner responsible for development,
Louis Michel, said that biofuels were a ‘catastrophe’.17
Most EU Member States also switched their position on biofuels. At the
end of June, the French government came out against the EU’s 10 per cent
biofuels target and indeed any target, arguing that the EU had proposed things
the wrong way round by setting targets prior to environmental and social
criteria for the production of biofuels.18 In early July, European energy min-
isters backed away from the EU’s biofuels for transport target, admitting a
gross confusion on their part in which they said they had been misreading
policy documents since the target was initially proposed a year and a half
earlier.19 The ministers said that upon closer inspection, EU proposals that
aimed for a target of 10 per cent of fuels for cars and lorries to come from
biofuels by 2020 in fact only required 10 per cent of fuels to come from
renewable sources which may or may not be biofuels. These sources could
also include hydrogen fuel cells or electric cars using electricity from alter-
native sources.
In early July, the Parliament’s Environment Committee voted to cut the
EU’s biofuels target in a unanimous 36-0 vote, with eight abstentions. The
MEPs recommended that the EU should aim to make between 8 and 10 per
cent of energy for transport come from renewable sources by 2020, with an
interim target of 4 per cent by 2015. Of this latter target, at least 20 per cent
would have to come from electric cars or the use of hydrogen fuel, or
alternately biogas or second-generation biofuels made from algae or agricul-
tural waste. The Commission responded with concern, while environmental
campaigners welcomed the higher target, but repeated their insistence that
biofuels should be excluded altogether. On 11 September, members of the
16 EUObserver, 14 January 2008.
17 EUObserver, 24 April 2008.
18 EUObserver, 30 June 2008.
19 EUObserver, 7 July 2008.
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European Parliament’s Industry Committee voted overwhelmingly to re-
establish the original target of using renewable sources for transport fuel for
10 per cent of vehicles by 2020, but confirmed that these sources were not
necessarily traditional biofuels, recommending that two-fifths of the 10 per
cent target would have to come via cars that run on hydrogen or that use
electricity from renewable sources such as solar and wind power, or from
so-called second-generation biofuels. MEPs also voted for a major review in
2014 of biofuel impact on the environment and on food prices before Member
States could continue with the 2020 goal.
The 9 December inter-institutional agreement supported the Commis-
sion’s original target figure but also provided some non-binding encourage-
ment to Member States to increase their use of renewable sources other than
first-generation biofuels. According to the agreement, second-generation bio-
fuels will be able to be counted twice towards the 10 per cent target and
electric cars could be counted at two and a half times their real contribution
towards the target. Binding sub-targets for forms of renewable transport such
as electric cars or clean-energy trains which had been introduced by the
Parliament were abandoned, leaving Member States free to choose whether to
count these toward the 10 per cent target. In the inter-institutional agreement,
biofuels will have to achieve a 50 per cent saving in greenhouse gas emissions
by 2017 in order to be accepted under the 10 per cent target. This figure
represented a compromise splitting the difference between the Commission’s
35 per cent and the Parliament’s Industry Committee’s 60 per cent saving by
2015. The move to 50 per cent would be subject to a review. Yet the Com-
mission’s controversial and unverified new rules for calculating the green-
house gas impact of different biofuels will apply – thus allowing European
sugar beet to continue to be used in the production of biofuels. The Parliament
gave in on most of its previous demands. Environmentalist groups were
exasperated with the agreement which they said represented a major defeat on
biofuels.20
Conclusion
There has been considerable criticism by many MEPs, environmentalist
groups and others of the climate change package adopted in December 2008.
Some have called the 20 per cent cuts by 2020 a ‘mirage’ given the extent to
which Member States will be able to engage in carbon offsetting.21 Even the
20 Financial Times, 10 December 2008.
21 EUObserver, 12 December 2008.
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Financial Times bemoaned the concessions made to heavy industry,22 which
is to be shielded from much of the cost of buying tradeable permits in the ETS
– the major concession made to principally Poland and Germany. The con-
cessions fundamentally undermine efforts to make polluters pay for emis-
sions, seen as an essential step in fighting climate change. However, that a
deal was achieved on the verge of the worst recession faced by Europe since
the 1930s should be celebrated as an accomplishment. The EU’s climate
change package agreed on 17 December is the world’s most stringent and sets
the benchmark for the international negotiations that are set to take place in
2009.
Key Readings
Knill and Liefferink’s (2007) Environmental Politics in the European Union
textbook provides an excellent introduction to the making, development
and implementation of EU environmental policy.
Pedersen et al.’s (2008) Energy Policy for Europe: Identifying the European
Added-Value is a CEPS Task Force Report prepared by a group consisting
of industry, NGOs and EU officials and other experts examining the main
direction, principles and added-value of EU energy policy and the key
measures that will be crucial for a successful policy. The report focuses
upon energy market and security issues as well as climate change.
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